Published September 1996
by Irwin Professional Publishing .
Written in English
|The Physical Object|
|Number of Pages||242|
Institutional Investors and Corporate Governance: Best Practices for Increasing Corporate Value [Brancato, Carolyn Kay] on *FREE* shipping on qualifying offers. Institutional Investors and Corporate Governance: Best Practices for Increasing Corporate ValueCited by: The Role of Institutional Investors in Promoting Good Corporate Governance. We have discussed how corporate governance and the practice of ethical and normative business practices are essential for companies to stay the course and reap longer term benefits. Underlying the issue of corporate governance by institutional investors are changes in financi ng patterns which have led to a rise in the importance of securities market finance for Author: E. Philip Davis. Abstract. This paper provides evidence linking corporate governance mechanisms to higher bond ratings and lower bond yields. Governance mechanisms can reduce default risk by mitigating agency costs and monitoring managerial performance and by reducing information asymmetry between the firm and the by:
We examine institutional investors’ preferences for corporate governance mechanisms. We find little evidence of an association between total institutional ownership and governance mechanisms. However, using revealed preferences, we identify a small group of “governance-sensitive” institutions that exhibit persistent associations between Cited by: What role do independent institutional investors play in the corporate governance of listed German companies? The authors provide insight into an empirical and qualitative research study, exploring the importance of communication and the role, independence and expertise, responsibilities, influence and monitoring of institutional investors. Institutional investors appear to have selective preferences regarding corporate social responsibility. They appear indifferent to the presence of positive environmental (E) and social (S) indicators, but underweight stocks with negative ES indicators. This asymmetric pattern is particularly strong for longer-horizon : John R. Nofsinger, Johan Sulaeman, Abhishek Varma. Additional Physical Format: Online version: Institutional investors, social investing, and corporate governance. Washington, D.C.: National Legal Center for the.
Some problems from an international perspective / Tom Hadden --Public pension fund activism in corporate governance reconsidered / Roberta Romano --Boards of directors versus institutional investors / Leo Herzel --CEO performance, board types and board performance: a first cut / Kenneth E. Scott, Allan W. Kleidon --Institutional investors in. In our paper, Can Institutional Investors Improve Corporate Governance Through Collective Action?, which was recently made publicly available on SSRN, we examine whether a collective action organization of institutional investors can significantly influence firms’ governance in institutional investor ownership over the last few decades puts these . Several papers document the ability of institutional investors to acquire information, improve governance, and make markets more efficient (Lakonishok, Shleifer, Vishny, , Nesbitt, , Sias, Starks, , Nagel, , Barber, Odean, ) while other research finds results suggestive of opportunism without long-term benefit, and with Cited by: Corporate Governance Failures: The Role of Institutional Investors in the Global Financial Crisis exposes the misdeeds and lapses of these institutional investors leading up to the recent economic meltdown. In this collection of original essays, edited by pioneers in the field of fiduciary capitalism, top legal and financial practitioners and.